Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic:  The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law by Craver, Charles B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 6 
1995 
Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of 
Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law 
Charles B. Craver 
George Washington University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to 
Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/22 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE 
TITANIC: THE INADEQUACY OF 
MODEST PROPOSALS TO 
REFORM LABOR LAW 
Charles B. Craver* 
AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
SHIPS AND THE LAW. By William B. Gould N. Cambridge: The 
MIT Press. 1993. Pp. x, 313. $37.50. 
It is impossible for any neutral observer to be sanguine regard-
ing the current state of the American labor movement.1 The union 
density rate - the percentage of nonagricultural labor force par-
ticipants in labor organizations - has declined from a high of 35 % 
in 19542 to15.5% today.3 When the increase in public sector union-
ization over the past several decades is discounted, the dire state of 
private sector unions becomes even more apparent. The private 
sector density rate is currently an anemic 10.9%4 - the lowest fig-
ure since 1936. If the rate of membership decline over the past 
twelve years continues, the private sector union density rate may 
fall to five percent by the end of this decade.5 Labor organizations 
would only be relevant - and, in light of international competition, 
would diminish in significance - in such heavy industries as auto-
motive, electronics, and steel. 
The decline of labor organizations might be palatable if counter-
balanced by increased respect for and protection of individual em-
ployee rights. This has not, however, been the case. Even though 
Congress has enacted more expansive statutes protecting employ-
ees against certain forms of invidious discrimination, and even 
though employees enjoy minimal wage, health and safety, and ben-
* Leroy S. Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.S. 
1967, M. Indus. & Lab. Rel. 1968, Cornell; J.D. 1971, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. See generally CHAru.Es B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF 
nm AMERICAN LABOR MoVEMENT (1993); MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF 0ROAN-
IZED LABOR IN nm UNITED STATES (1987); PAUL C. WEILER, GoVERNINO nm WORK-
PLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990). 
2. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 1, at 10, tbl. 1. 
3. See Data for 1994 Shows Membership Held Steady at 16.7 Million, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 27, at D-1 (Feb. 9, 1995). 
4. Id. 
5. See Union Coverage of U.S. Private Workforce Predicted to Fall Below 5 Percent by 
2000, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at A-1 (Dec. 18, 1989). 
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efit protection, most American workers are less confident of their 
future employment security today than they have been since the 
Great Depression. Under the traditional employment-at-will doc-
trine that still is accepted in forty-nine states, workers may be ter-
minated at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause. 
Technological advancements may supplant them, or they may lose 
their positions to workers in emerging nations who earn one-tenth 
the wages of U.S. personnel. Their employers are under no legal 
obligation to discuss these possible developments with the directly 
interested employees before implementing final management deci-
sions and laying off the adversely affected individuals. Nor are 
firms required to consult their workers regarding other operational 
modifications that may profoundly alter employee job functions or 
future employment security. Rank-and-file personnel are given no 
more respect than the machines they operate. 
In his thoughtful book Agenda for Reform, Professor William 
Gould6 describes both the demise of the American labor movement 
and the continuing erosion of worker dignity and job security. He 
explores the absence of wrongful termination protection for most 
U.S. employees and the lack of meaningful worker participation 
programs. He then evaluates the need for National Labor Rela-
tions Act amendments that would streamline the certification pro-
cess and expand the scope of collective bargaining. He also 
proposes measures that would increase the economic weapons 
available to representative labor organizations. Gould concludes 
by comparing the American and Canadian experiences over the 
past several decades in an effort to understand the unique nature of 
the American decline in union density. 
In Agenda for Reform, Gould recommends many legal changes 
that would enhance individual employment rights, encourage the 
growth of unions, and contribute to the efficacy of the collective 
bargaining process. Even though a number of management repre-
sentatives consider many of Gould's proposals radical, his sug-
gested modifications are truly modest and, in fact, wholly 
inadequate to alleviate the crises facing ·both individual workers 
and labor organizations. They are more reflective of the current 
conservative political climate than of the true needs of American 
workers. 
It is time to acknowledge that U.S. workers have minimal em-
ployment dignity and almost no job security. Instead of being con-
sidered an integral part of the production or service process, they 
are treated like fungible machines. They are ignored by most man-
agement officials when critical operational decisions are formu-
6. Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Stanford University. Professor Gould is cur-
rently on leave from Stanford University and is Chair of the National Labor Relations Board. 
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lated, and they enjoy meager statutory protections. The 
circumstances affecting labor organizations are even worse. Unions 
have found it extremely difficult to organize new bargaining units, 
due to the overt hostility of most business firms. The relatively few 
labor organizations that currently represent employees are fearful 
of management-encouraged decertification efforts, find it increas-
ingly arduous to negotiate effectively over the most significant is-
sues affecting bargaining unit members, and have few economic 
weapons they can use to support their bargaining demands. In the 
coming years, the United States must decide whether it will view 
free trade unions as an important part of a democratic society or, 
instead, provide corporate leaders with unrestrained authority over 
lower-level personnel. 
J. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TIIE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF UNIONS 
In his first substantive chapter, Chapter 1\vo, Gould briefly de-
scribes the expansive growth of unions from 1935 until 1955, a 
growth fueled by the ability of newly created industrial unions to 
organize the automobile, electronics, rubber, steel, textiles, and 
transportation industries. Curiously absent from this part of the 
book is any significant acknowledgement of the momentous impact 
of the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 in 
1935 and its explicit congressional policy "encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and ... protecting the exer-
cise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organiza-
tion ... · ."B 
Gould next describes the three major developments that have 
contributed to the substantial decline of labor organizations over 
the past several decades. The first factor cited is the development 
of a global economic system that has forced domestic firms to com-
pete with business enterprises in lower-wage countries (pp. 12-13). 
The rise of multinational corporations has undermined labor soli-
darity and forced high-wage American employees to compete 
against personnel in countries such as Mexico, where wage rates are 
approximately one-tenth of those in the United States (pp. 12-13). 
Moreover, the creation of the North American Free Trade Zone 
will encourage the migration of traditional unionized manufactur-
ing jobs from the United States to Northern Mexico. American 
production workers whose jobs are not transferred will need to 
moderate their wage and benefit expectations if they are to avoid 
ultimate displacement by foreign laborers (p. 13). 
7. Pub. L No. 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 
(1988)). 
8. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1988). 
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Between 1969 and 1985, 3,500,000 production jobs were trans-
ferred from the United States to other countries.9 Over the next 
decade, employers will relocate several million additional produc-
tion jobs to Mexican facilities to take advantage of the lower labor 
costs, minimal health and environmental law enforcement, and hos-
tile union climate in that country. Millions of other production jobs 
have been supplanted by technologically advanced machines, as the 
United States has changed from a production economy to a post-
industrial society composed primarily of white-collar and service 
personnel.10 These phenomena will threaten the continued viability 
of major industrial unions like the United Automobile Workers, the 
United Steelworkers, the United Mine Workers, and the Interna-
tional Union of Electrical Workers. Although the global economy 
and deindustrialization have also affected nations such as Canada, 
Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, their labor 
organizations have not suffered the significant membership losses 
sustained by U.S. unions (pp. 14-15, tbl. 2.1). This observation 
would suggest that factors unique to the United States are primarily 
responsible for the decline of American labor organizations. 
Even within the United States, the increase in international 
competition does not explain the lack of union organizing success in 
the expanding service sector among employees whose jobs cannot 
be easily exported to foreign nations. Although employees per-
forming routinized jobs for bureaucratic institutions in the banking, 
computer, health care, and insurance industries should be ripe for 
collectivization, union success in these service areas has been mini-
mal. Gould attributes this situation to his second determinative fac-
tor - the antilabor environment generated during the Reagan 
administration (pp. 13-14). The Reagan Labor Board enlarged 
management prerogatives by refusing to require collective bargain-
ing with respect to corporate decisions that Board members 
thought management officials should unilaterally decide (pp. 21-
25). Support for Gould's view regarding the negative impact of the 
anti-union Reagan presidency may be found in the data indicating 
that during the 1980s the absolute number of union members de-
clined for the first time since the enactment of the NLRA.11 
Gould fails to ask whether the election of President Reagan ac-
tually generated the anti-union climate of the 1980s or merely 
served as a reflection of an antilabor environment created by pri-
vate business firms in the mid to late 1970s that culminated in the 
election of President Reagan in 1980. American business leaders 
9. See CRA. VER, supra note 1, at 45. 
10. See id. at 40·42. 
11. See id. at 35. 
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have historically opposed worker organizing.12 During the late 
1800s and early 1900s, for example, they used antitrust and criminal 
conspiracy doctrines to prevent unionization.13 They required em-
ployees to sign "yellow-dog" contracts that precluded union mem-
bership and hired private detective agencies to report on the 
concerted activities of their workers. Employers summarily termi-
nated union sympathizers and blacklisted them, preventing subse-
quent employment with other area firms. 
Business leaders vigorously opposed enactment of the NLRA, 
and they lobbied diligently for the adoption of the 1947 Labor Man-
agement Relations Act14 and the 1959 Labor Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act15 amendments to the NLRA that were 
designed to dilute the rights previously extended to employees and 
labor organizations. In some instances, moreover, legislative modi-
fications were not even necessary because conservative Labor 
Board and court decisions had already narrowed worker rights. For 
example, even though the original NLRA explicitly guaranteed em-
ployees the right to withhold their labor during bargaining dis-
putes, 16 a pro business-oriented Supreme Court quickly weakened 
this fundamental right by holding that employers could hire perma-
nent replacements for striking workers.17 
Unionized firms appeared to tolerate their representative labor 
organizations during the 1960s and early 1970s, but the hyperinfla-
tion of the mid-1970s reminded these employers of the high costs of 
unionization. Cost-of-living adjustment provisions in bargaining 
agreements caused the union wage premium - the difference be-
tween the wages paid to organized workers and their nonunion 
counterparts - to increase in many industries to at least :fifteen-to-
twenty percent. Unionized businesses thus found it more difficult 
to compete with unorganized companies, so they began to look for 
ways to undermine the labor movement. In 1977, when union offi-
cials sought modest changes in the NLRA through the proposed 
Labor Law Reform Act, business organizations lobbied diligently 
12. See generally id. at 47-51. 
13. See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) {holding 
union strike activity to be violation of antitrust laws); Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 {1908) 
(same); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011(Mass.1900) {holding union strike activity unlawful as 
criminal conspiracy); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (same). 
14. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 {1947). 
15. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 {1959). 
16. See Pub. L No. 74-198, § 13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 {1935) (codified as amended at 29 
u.s.c. § 163 {1988)). 
17. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); see also Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fedn. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432-43 {1989) 
{holding that less senior "cross-over" employees refusing to honor initial strike call or decid-
ing to return to work during the stoppage could, after labor dispute had been resolved, retain 
higher positions obtained while more senior colleagues were on strike). 
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to prevent these legislative changes. Union leaders felt betrayed by 
this behavior, which served as a reminder of the increasingly adver-
sarial labor-management environment they faced. 
By the late 1970s, the business community realized that control 
of the White House could prevent the enactment of prolabor legis-
lation and allow it to seize control of the Labor Board and the fed-
eral judiciary. Business organizations thus expended millions of 
dollars in an effort to place Ronald Reagan in the White House. 
Having accomplished this goal, they then lobbied effectively for ap-
propriate presidential vetoes and for the appointment of judges 
who believed that unionization generated a cartel-based wage pre-
mium that undermined free market efficiency. These judges 
thought that collective bargaining by representative unions should 
not be permitted to interfere with the exercise of managerial discre-
tion. The Supreme Court thus ruled that "in view of an employer's 
need for unencumbered decisionmaking," the duty to bargain over 
corporate decisions having a substantial impact on the continued 
employment of bargaining unit personnel "should be required only 
if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of 
the business."18 If one acknowledges that a fundamental purpose 
of unionization is to allow employees to "interfere with" manage-
rial freedom, it becomes obvious that the First National Mainte-
nance decision qupted above reads more like a legislative 
committee ~eport than a judicial decision. The Court's assault on 
the organizational rights of workers continued in another case that 
held that university professors are "managerial" personnel who are 
not subject to NLRA coverage.19 These holdings encouraged the 
conservative Reagan Labor Board to erode other doctrines protect-
ing employee rights.20 
18. First Nat. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). 
19. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); see also NLRB v. Health Care & 
Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S. a. 1778, 1782-83 (1994) (holding that professional peo-
ple who minimally direct the work of nonprofessionals constitute excluded "supervisors"). 
See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bar-
gaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE LJ. 689 (1990) (arguing that traditional collec-
tive bargaining subjects are incompatible with professionalism and that modifications to 
collective bargaining are needed to make the labor system more conducive to professional 
values); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From Covered Professionals 
Under the NLRA, 89 CoLUM. L. R.Ev.1775 (1989) (arguing that the exclusion of professional 
employees as managers is contrary to the NLRA's legislative history). 
20. See, e.g., Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986) (holding that nonunion em-
ployees who individually complain about unsafe conditions are not engaged in a protected 
concerted activity), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985) (holding that nonunion 
workers do not have right to have fellow employees accompany them to management investi-
gatory interviews that they think will result in disciplinary action). 
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The third critical factor that Gould cites to explain both the de-
cline of unions and the erosion of individual employment rights is 
the recent expansion of more tenuous employment relationships 
(pp. 25-26). According to Jonathan Hiatt and Lynn Rhinehart, 
"The past decade has seen tremendous growth in the contingent 
work force. Together, temporary, contract, and part-time workers 
make up 25 percent to 30 percent of the work force as a whole."21 
These attenuated employment relationships have become especially 
popular in retail and service establishments, making it more diffi-
cult for unions to organize these businesses. 
To explain the degree of anti-union sentiment exhibited by most 
American firms as opposed to their European counterparts, Gould 
emphasizes a crucial difference between collective bargaining in 
many Western European countries and collective bargaining in the 
United States. Collective negotiations in nations like Germany and 
Sweden are conducted on a centralized basis at the regional or na-
tional level, with government fiat extending the negotiated wages 
and benefits to firms throughout the industry involved (p. 35). In 
the United States, in contrast, bargaining takes place in a highly 
decentralized manner, with negotiated wages and benefits affecting 
only the workers in the pertinent bargaining units. This American 
practice greatly increases the cost of unionization to organized com-
panies by permitting unorganized firms to gain a competitive ad-
vantage through the adoption of lower wages and less generous 
fringe benefits. This factor explains why organized employers have 
worked diligently over the past fifteen years to decertify, or at least 
to weaken, incumbent bargaining representatives. 
Although Gould notes in a subsequent chapter the use of un-
lawful tactics by many American employers to discourage worker 
organizing, he discounts the overall impact of this phenomenon (pp. 
151-52). Evaluations of Labor Board data by Professor Paul Wei-
ler22 and by Professors Robert LaLonde and Bernard Meltzer23 
have documented an alarming increase in employer unfair labor 
practices during organizing campaigns over the past fifteen years. 
Employers routinely threaten plant closures or production transfers 
and frequently terminate key union supporters in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3).24 These tactics make it difficult for unions to organize 
21. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Work Force: A Chal-
lenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW. 143, 144 (1994). 
22. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 238-39. 
23. See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another 
Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 961-69 (1991); see 
also Paul C. Weiler, Hard Tunes for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. Clu. L. 
REv. 1015 (1991). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). This provision makes it an unfair labor practice for 
employers to discriminate against employees to encourage or discourage membership in la-
bor organizations. Regarding the pervasive use of questionable anti-union tactics by employ-
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new units. Workers who fear employer retaliation are hesitant to 
demonstrate their union support openly, and many individuals are 
afraid to sign union authorization cards or to vote for union repre-
sentation. Anemic Labor Board remedies have done little to dis-
courage these unlawful anti-union tactics. Corporations realize that 
it is often less costly to defend and even remedy pervasive unfair 
labor practices than to be saddled with collective bargaining obliga-
tions that will place them at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis their 
unorganized competitors. It is this illegal behavior by a number of 
American firms that distinguishes the rapidly deteriorating union 
situation in the United States from the more stable union environ-
ments in Canada and most Western European countries. 
In addition to citing illegal employer practices, Gould notes the 
relatively unique business union movement in the United States, 
drawing a comparison to the social and political labor organizations 
indigenous to Western European nations (pp. 45-47). Foreign labor 
movements have historically united workers by both socioeconomic 
class and political affiliation. This factor has enhanced union soli-
darity during periods of economic crisis and political hostility. In 
the United States, in contrast, employees tend to view labor organi- . 
zations solely in terms of the economic benefits they may obtain 
through the bargaining process. When workers conclude that bar-
gaining representatives are unlikely to advance their economic in-
terests substantially, they opt for nonrepresentation. It would thus 
be beneficial for American labor leaders to become more politically 
visible. They must also convince rank-and-file personnel that they 
need a collective voice to counterbalance the economic power of 
their corporate employers. The fact that executive compensation 
has increased much faster than rank-and-file worker pay over the 
past fifteen years (p. 61) should suggest that employees lack the 
power to advance their own interests on an individualized basis. 
Gould briefly mentions the fact that American labor officials 
have not provided exemplary leadership (p. 31 ). He notes that un-
democratic and corrupt leaders have contributed to the negative 
public perception of unions. He also could have cited the fact that 
union officers no longer reflect the heterogeneous composition of 
the present labor market. Most national union officers continue to 
be older, white males who evince the craft or industrial union phi-
losophies of the 1950s or 1960s. They find it difficult to relate to the 
women and minorities who have been entering the labor force in 
record numbers. Many union officers also fail to comprehend the 
need for both novel organizing techniques that will appeal to white-
ers during organizing campaigns, see generally MARTIN JAY LEvrrr & TERRY CoNRow, 
CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER (1993). 
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collar workers and new organizations that might reflect the aspira-
tions of those employees. 
In recent years, while many business firms have retained sophis-
ticated behaviorists to convince white-collar workers that it would 
be demeaning and unprofessional to collectivize, most labor or-
ganizers have continued to use blue-collar appeals that repulse 
most educated employees. The American labor movement must 
create new organizations that will do for white-collar industries, 
such as banking, insurance, computers, and health care, what the 
old industrial unions did for mass production industries during the 
1930s and 1940s. Labor organizations will only survive in the com-
ing decades if they can organize physicians, nurses, lawyers, com-
puter specialists, insurance agents, :financial institution personnel, 
and similar workers. As white-collar jobs become increasingly rou-
tinized, this task should become easier. Nonetheless, if labor lead-
ers do not develop the necessary institutions now, unions may never 
be able to regain their previous vitality. 
II. JOB SECURITY AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION PROTECTION 
In Chapter Three, Gould discusses one of the most significant 
differences between organized and unorganized workers - the 
availability of protection against unjust dismissal. He emphasizes 
the fact that individuals covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments receive protection against unjust discipline through "just 
cause" provisions and the availability of grievance arbitration pro-
cedures to review adverse employer decisions (pp. 63-64). Gould 
then reviews the traditional employment-at-will doctrine that al-
lows employers to terminate most employment relationships at any 
time for any reason {pp. 66-67). He examines the three exceptions 
to that doctrine that many state courts have created to deal with 
perceived inequities. Most states have adopted a public policy ex-
ception that precludes discharges that contravene important public 
policies {pp. 67-69). A number of jurisdictions have also adopted 
an express or implied contract theory that enables wrongfully ter-
minated workers to sue to enforce oral management representa-
tions or written personnel policy statements indicating that 
employees will only be discharged for valid reasons (pp. 69-74). A 
few state courts have provided employees with additional protec-
tion against unfair dismissals through their application of implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing in individual employment 
contracts (p. 72). 
Gould notes that the United States is the only major industrial 
nation that does not provide private sector workers with statutory 
protection against unjust dismissals (p. 77). Even though he be-
lieves that employees receive the most effective job security 
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through bargaining-agreement just cause and grievance-arbitration 
provisions, Gould recognizes that the vast majority of American 
workers who are unorganized enjoy no such protection (p. 77). The 
author thus proposes the enactment of federal ·legislation that 
would prohibit wrongful terminations (pp. 80-87). He discounts la-
bor fears that the enactment of such statutory protection would di-
minish worker receptivity to unionization because he thinks that 
unions would still provide the most expansive employment security 
through just cause provisions (pp. 90-91). Under contractual just 
cause provisions, labor arbitrators have traditionally required em-
ployers to demonstrate the presence of just cause for termination.25 
Under a statutorily created wrongful termination law, however, dis-
charged workers would presumably be obliged to establish that 
they were impermissibly dismissed. This important proof distinc-
tion would thus provide unionized personnel with greater protec-
tion than would be available to their unorganized cohorts. 
After a brief probationary period of up to one year, the statute 
would cover all nonexecutive personnel employed by firms with at 
least fifty workers.26 Courts could then use the traditional just 
cause standards developed by labor arbitrators to determine which 
terminations are inappropriate. Although unionized grievants 
could have their cases resolved through grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures, unorganized complainants would have their cases resolved 
by unemployment compensation administrative law judges who 
regularly determine similar issues under misconduct disqualification 
provisions (pp. 98-99). Wrongfully terminated individuals would be 
presumptively entitled to monetary relief, but Gould would be re-
luctant to create a presumption in favor of reinstatement in the ab-
sence of union representatives who could monitor reinstatement 
directives (p. 101 ). 
Gould's recommendations are similar to those made by Profes-
sor Clyde Summers almost twenty years ago.27 They are as valid 
today as they were then. Despite Montana's enactment of a wrong-
ful termination law28 and the adoption of a Model Employment 
Termination Act by the Uniform Commissioners on State Laws,29 
little progress has been made in this critical area. If courts continue 
to expand judicial exceptions in egregious discharge cases, employ-
25. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER Eucouro, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 661-63 
(4th ed. 1985). 
26. Pp. 87-88, 95-97. I would encourage Congress to extend wrongful discharge protec-
tion to finns with twenty-five or more employees, and possibly even to companies with fif-
teen or more employees that are now covered by typical federal civil rights statutes. 
27. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust ,Dismissal: Tune for a 
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976). 
28. See MoNT. ConE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (1993). 
29. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) Individual Employment Rts. Manual 540:21 (Dec. 1991). 
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ers will recognize that the cost of defending these claims and of 
satisfying increasingly generous plaintiff verdicts is becoming ex-
tremely burdensome. They may thus realize that legislated protec-
tion with prescribed monetary remedies would be preferable to the 
continued risk of excessive compensatory and punitive damage 
awards in tort actions. ' 
Employers should also acknowledge other benefits resulting 
from wrongful termination protection.3o Managers frequently de-
cry the lack of firm loyalty exhibited by contemporary employees. 
But it is difficult to expect significant loyalty from newly hired indi-
viduals who are expressly informed that their new relationships 
may be terminated at any time for any reason. H workers exper-
ienced greater corporate loyalty in the form of meaningful employ-
ment security, they would have a greater commitment to their 
employers. Worker turnover would be reduced, and employee mo-
rale and productivity would probably increase. Companies would 
also be more willing to assume the costs of employee training if 
they thought that the trainees would be more likely to remain in 
their employ in future years. 
Proponents of wrongful termination statutes have often been as 
reluctant as Gould to provide for the reinstatement of improperly 
fired individuals who wish to return to their former employment 
environments, but this reluctance is unfounded. When labor arbi-
trators conclude that unionized employees have been discharged in 
contravention of contractual just cause provisions, they regularly 
order reinstatement. Federal and state courts also use the reinstate-
ment remedy to rectify discriminatory discharges based on race, 
religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, or other impermis-
sible factors. In my experience as a labor arbitrator, I have directed 
the reinstatement of a number of grievants who had been unjustly 
dismissed. I am not aware of a single case in which employers were 
unable to return the grievants to their former positions.31 H expe-
dited adjudication procedures could be provided through either 
contractual grievance-arbitration mechanisms or administrative law 
judge hearings, reinstatement difficulties should be rare. On the 
other hand, if wrongfully terminated employees are not returned to 
their former employment environments, they may suffer both emo-
tional and monetary losses that cannot be alleviated satisfactorily 
throµgh front pay or severance pay awards. Their future employ-
30. For cogent arguments in favor of wrongful termination legislation, see WEILER, supra 
note l, at 48-104. For an economic argument supporting unrestrained freedom of contract, 
see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984). 
31. Federal and state courts rarely encounter difficulties with respect to individuals they 
reinstate to nonunion settings. If persons reinstated to nonunion environments under wrong-
ful termination laws faced retaliation, they could always file additional wrongful termination 
claims. 
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ment security would also be diminished through the loss of their 
previously accumulated seniority rights. I would thus urge adoption 
of statutory provisions that would provide for the reinstatement of 
unjustly discharged individuals. 
III. THE NEED To CREATE WORKER 
p ARTIC:q>ATION ~ROGRAMS 
A. Gould's Analysis 
Gould next turns, in Chapter Four, to worker participation pro-
grams in both the United States and other countries. He initially 
notes that union leaders have not generally been receptive to such 
programs because of the frequent use of shop committees and com-
pany unions during the 1930s and 1940s to prevent the selection of 
independent bargaining representatives (p. 110). A number of 
business firms have recently decided to create various quality of 
work life (QWL) programs that involve shop-level committees con-
sisting of employees and often managerial personnel. These com-
mittees are designed to enhance worker-management 
communication and to improve productivity and quality (p. 111). 
Gould carefully examines the German co-determination model 
(pp. 115-17). The German Works Council Act requires firms to 
create works councils at the shop level to enable employees to par-
ticipate in decisions that affect their employment conditions and job 
security. Corporate leaders must inform works councils about con-
templated decisions that would affect employees and must supply 
committee members with the information they need to evaluate the 
possible effects of those decisions. Management officials must then 
consult with works council members in an effort to achieve mutual 
accommodations. If no agreements can be reached, arbitral or la-
bor court proceedings resolve the issues (p. 116). · 
The works councils, which operate at the shop level, do not in-
terfere with the functions of representative labor organizations that 
negotiate agreements at the regional or national level (p. 116). The 
Co-determination Act of 1976 provides employees with additional 
input at the corporate level. Large firms are required to have cor-
porate boards that are composed of one-third or one-half 
employee-elected representatives (p. 117). Although procedural 
rules permit shareholder and management representatives to make 
final decisions regarding deadlocked issues, board members usually 
endeavor to achieve mutually acceptable results. 
Gould also evaluates innovative examples of labor-management 
cooperation within the United States. He describes the collectively 
bargained programs involving the United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) and New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), 
and the UAW and Saturn, a General Motors subsidiary (pp. 123-
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31 ). Employees participate in production planning and learn differ-
ent jobs that they perform on a rotating basis. General categories 
replace narrowly defined job classifications, thus providing the 
companies with managerial flexibility. NUMMI and Saturn execu-
tives recognized that cooperative programs designed to increase 
worker productivity and product quality could succeed only if the 
company promised employees reasonable job security and a share 
of the resulting profits (pp. 126-27). Gould emphasizes that these 
efforts involve "perpetual bargaining" over numerous issues of joint 
interest that arise regularly in the shop (pp. 130-31). 
Worker participation programs function most effectively, ac-
cording to Gould, when compensation is related to skill levels and 
to individual or group performance or both (p. 132). The author 
indicates that employees know when they are being fleeced and 
says that only meaningful worker participation plans can succeed in 
the long run (p. 135). If corporate managers are the primary bene-
ficiaries of enhanced firm revenues, lower-level workers will 
quickly revert to pre-worker participation practices. 
Older court and recent Labor Board decisions have made it dif-
ficult for firms to establish even bona fide worker participation pro-
grams without risking unfair labor practice liability under Section 
8(a)(2) of the NLRA,32 which makes it unlawful for employers to 
dominate or provide financial support to labor organizations. Be-
cause the NLRA expansively defines the term labor organization to 
include any "employee representation committee or plan ... which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employ-
ers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours 
of employment, or conditions of work,"33 court and Labor Board 
determinations have found certain worker participation committees 
to constitute employer-dominated labor organizations.34 
Gould suggests that Section 8(a)(2) has outlived its usefulness 
and should simply be repealed (pp. 140-41). Although the abroga-
tion of Section 8(a)(2) might appear to give disingenuous employ-
ers the opportunity to create sham worker-management 
committees as an anti-union device, this fear is unfounded. Any 
firm that engaged in such insincere behavior would clearly be guilty 
of restraining or coercing its employees with respect to the exercise 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). 
33. 29 u.s.c. § 152(5) (1988). 
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., 311 N.LR.B. 893 (1993); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 
F.3d 1148 (1994). 
Some court decisions have been more flexible regarding the legality of bona fide worker 
participation plans. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert 
denied, 423 U.S. fr75 (1975); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 
1955). 
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of their protected NLRA rights in violation of Section 8(a)(l).35 
Although subtle uses of employee-employer committees to discour-
age collectivization might be difficult to prove, this is the type of 
conduct the Labor Board has historically regulated with minimal 
difficulty. 
Despite his support for voluntary worker participation pro-
grams, Gould does not propose legislation mandating greater em-
ployee involvement in corporate management. Even though I 
believe that many employees in white-collar and service occupa-
tions will eventually decide that collectivization may enhance their 
employment interests, the union density rate in the private sector 
will not likely ever exceed twenty to twenty-five percent in the 
United States. American workers are so individualistic and afraid 
of being considered part of the working class and employer opposi-
tion is so substantial that union membership figures could not con-
ceivably approach those in many Western European countries. 
Thus, seventy-five to eighty percent of private sector personnel will 
continue to lack the ability to influence their employment destinies 
through the traditional bargaining process. Gould deals with this 
reality by suggesting that unions representing twenty or thirty per-
cent of employees in a particular unit be given the legal right to 
speak for those individuals (p. 141). Without more formal partici-
pation rights, however, it is doubtful that nonmajority representa-
tives would possess the economic leverage they would need to 
protect the persons they represent. 
It is time for Congress to recognize two critical realities. First, 
the NLRA has truly become an irrelevant statute for the vast ma-
jority of private sector employees. If unorganized workers are to 
have the capacity to affect their employment conditions, the legisla-
ture must provide them with new statutory rights guaranteeing that 
privilege. Second, corporate success is dependent upon three 
symbiotic ~oups: (i) the investors who provide the necessary capi-
tal, (ii) the managers who provide the requisite leadership, and (iii) 
the employees who carry out the regular job functions. 
Corporate laws carefully protect the rights of business investors. 
Prospective shareholders receive extensive firm information before 
they decide to purchase shares, and they participate in the election 
of corporate directors. Firm managers owe shareholders a fiduciary· 
duty and are liable to stockholders who are injured by breaches of 
this duty. Because capital is a highly mobile commodity, sharehold-
ers can protect their interests through diversification and through 
transfer of their financial support from poorly performing busi-
nesses to other investments. 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1988). 
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Corporate managers also possess the capacity to protect them-
selves against adverse corporate decisions. They usually exercise 
meaningful discretion with respect to decisions affecting their own 
futures. Corporate managers can often avoid employment-at-will 
insecurity through individual employment contracts that guarantee 
their continued employment for specified time periods. They may 
be able to obtain generous severance packages in case they lose 
their positions through corporate reorganizations or buy-outs. 
Moreover, they directly benefit from business success through bo-
nus payments and stock options that are unavailable to most 
subordinate personnel. Finally, corporate managers even have ac-
cess to confidential business information that would let them know 
when they should begin to contemplate alternative employment. 
Rank-and-file employees are treated the same as the equipment 
they use or operate. Even though they commit their working lives 
to the success of their respective employers, their employment can 
normally be terminated at any time for any reason. They are not 
privy to confidential firm information, and they are not consulted 
about contemplated business decisions that may affect their em-
ployment destinies. Although workers may resort to the "exit 
voice" and seek other jobs when they are dissatisfied with firm de-
velopments, most lack the unique skills to enjoy significant mobil-
ity. Furthermore, their pension rights and length of service 
frequently induce them to remain with their current employers dur-
ing periods of declining firm performance. 
B. Legislative-Approach 
The time has come to provide rank-and-file personnel with fun-
damental employment dignity. Congress should enact an 
employer-employee relations statute similar to the German Works 
Constitution Act of 1972.36 The statute would require every em-
ployer with at least fifteen or twenty-five employees to create a 
specified minimum number of works councils. One works council 
would be required for each separate facility with no more than a 
certain number of employees - for example, two hundred and fifty 
employees. For large facilities, the law would require separate 
works councils for each distinct department and for each group of 
interrelated departments containing employees who share a com-
36. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act], BGBl.I 13 (1972) (amended 
1985) (F.R.G.) {discussed on p. 117). Professor Paul Weiler previously proposed the creation 
of similar employee participation committees for American workers. See WEILER, supra 
note 1, at 283-306; see also Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging 
System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 149 {1993). For an explication of the 
German model, see Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in 
Germany, 15 CoMP. LAB. W. 26 (1993). 
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munity of employment interest.37 Every two years, employees 
would nominate and elect the members of their respective works 
councils. To ensure a meaningful dialogue between employees and 
management and to provide some employment protections for 
managerial personnel whose employment interests are more 
aligned with their subordinates than their superiors, lower and mid-
dle managers would be allowed to elect one-fifth or one-quarter of 
the council members. · · 
Business firms would need to provide works council members 
with information regarding basic operations and contemplated 
changes that would meaningfully affect working conditions or em-
ployee job security.38 Proposed corporate changes concerning basic 
operations, new technology, health and safety concerns, significant 
job transfers to other facilities, group layoffs, and individual termi-
nations would have to be presented to the appropriate works coun-
cil for consideration.39 In most cases, works council members and 
firm managers would likely agree upon the proper course to be 
taken. Rank-and-file employees understand the need for firm effi-
ciency and increased productivity to remain competitive in a global 
economy, and they recognize that superfluous or incompetent per-
sonnel cannot be retained indefinitely without threatening the em-
ployment security of all workers.40 Managers would obtain a better 
understanding of worker concerns and would be forced to recog-
nize the need to formulate corporate decisions that would maximize 
worker morale and loyalty. Congress should provide that when a 
majority - or perhaps a weighted majority41 - of y.rorks council 
members reject proposed managerial action, a mediator with busi-
ness expertise who was previously selected by managers and works 
council members would endeavor to achieve a conciliated agree-
ment. In those . infrequent instances in which no mutual accord 
could be reached, arbitrators selected by management and council 
members would ultimately resolve the issue. Expedited procedures 
37. Criteria similar to those presently used to define appropriate bargaining units under 
the NLRA could be used to detennine appropriate works council groupings under my 
proposal. 
38. Without the elimination of the information imbalance that currently exists between 
managers and lower-level personnel, employees would be unable to influence the corporate 
decisionmaking process significantly. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: 
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 76-78 (1993). 
39. When fundamental issues would affect personnel covered by several works councils, 
management would be required to consult with the relevant councils jointly in an effort to 
achieve a mutually acceptable accommodation of the competing interests. 
40. See JAMES c. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM 45, 131 (1977). 
41. To minimize works council-manager confrontations and the difficulties those contro-
versies could generate, weighted majorities of 60% or two-thirds might be required to reject 
managerial decisions. Congress might alternatively allow councils bare majority rejections 
for less significant issues and require weighted-majority rejections for fundamental policy 
determinations. 
" 
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could be used to generate final decisions within several days with 
respect to matters that must be resolved quickly. 
Congress should also mandate the election of one-quarter or 
one-third of corporate board members by nonexecutive personnel. 
Both rank-and-file employees and lower-level managers should be 
given the opportunity to vote. This would guarantee board consid-
eration of worker interests when. important firm policies are de-
bated. All corporate board members should be both obliged to 
consider worker interests when making business decisions and sub-
ject to liability to rank-and-file employees when they violate this 
:fiduciary obligation.42 Statutory provisions should recognize their 
dual loyalties to shareholders and to workers by granting the board 
members sufficient discretion to make good faith managerial deci-
sions when stockholder and employee interests conflict without the 
fear of liability. On the other hand, when board members fail to 
consider worker interests adequately, they should be subject to the 
same legal accountability that would result if they failed to respect 
the interests of shareholders. 
The adoption of mandated worker participation programs 
would not render labor organizations obsolete. They could con-
tinue to provide employees with the expertise and assistance they 
would need when dealing with corporate boards or works coun-
cils.43 Unions should have the right to nominate employee slates 
for works council positions and should serve as a deterrent prevent-
ing employer agents from coercing or restraining employees with 
respect to the nomination and election of council or corporate 
board members. Such activities would significantly diminish firm 
conduct designed to undermine free worker elections. 
If a majority of employee-elected council members were affili-
ated with a particular labor organization, that entity would be 
granted exclusive bargaining rights similar to those currently en-
joyed by majority bargaining agents under the NLRA. If no labor 
organization enjoyed majority support, each union with twenty or 
twenty-five percent employee-elected council member support 
would be entitled to formal consultation rights.44 Firm managers 
would be required to consult with representatives from each organi-
zation with the requisite support before they made final decisions 
concerning matters affecting employee interests. Even though for-
42. See Gottesman, supra note 38, at 93-95; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring 
the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced 
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991). 
43. See generally Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 
U.S.F. L. REv. 169 (1991). 
44. In chapter 5, Professor Gould supports the concept of minority union representation 
rights similar to those proposed here; see also Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: 
Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993). 
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mal bargaining would not be necessary, these minority entities 
could provide managers with critical input, such as proposing alter-
natives that would be less injurious to employee interests. 
Business leaders would undoubtedly denounce legislative pro-
posals calling for the establishment of works councils and worker-
elected board members as unworkable and inefficient. What they 
would most re8ent would be the need to share their corporate 
power with rank-and-file personnel. Employees are not ignorant 
people. They usually understand basic operations, sometimes even 
more thoroughly than upper managers. Workers are in an advanta-
geous position to enhance productivity and firm quality, but they 
are presently hesitant to do so because such improvements might 
undermine their job security. If employers treated them as corpo-
rate partners in a cooperative venture and employees realized that 
new developments would not unduly affect their employment 
rights, the employees would be more inclined to propose and sup-
port operational changes. 
IV. PROPOSED REFORM OF THE NLRA 
In Chapter Five, Gould suggests that after sixty years; it is time 
to reassess the efficacy of the NLRA. He notes the call of some 
unionists for repeal of this legislation based on its unfair constraints 
on the exercise of collective power through secondary activity (pp. 
153-54). The author rejects this position, believing that a modified 
NLRA can continue to protect employee rights. Although my pro-
posed statutory changes mandating the creation of works councils 
and the election of employee representatives to corporate boards 
would render NLRA amendments superfluous, I realize that a 
probusiness Congress would be unlikely to contemplate seriously 
such radical changes in American employment law. People who 
think that President Clinton might consider my proposals should 
remember that his major legislative accomplishments at the time of 
this review have been the Senate approval of the Republican-
negotiated and business-community-supported North American 
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and the enactment of a rela-
tively conservative crime bill; The election of Republican majori-
ties in the House and Senate further diminishes the likelihood of 
proworker legislative reform. 
A. Representation Election and Certification Reform 
Gould maintains that the Labor Board excessively regulates the 
representation election process, especially with respect to campaign 
propaganda (p. 152). The empirical study of representation elec-
tions conducted by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman dur-
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ing the early 1970s provides support for this notion.45 Although 
subsequent evaluations of the same database have suggested that 
these experts may have underestimated the impact of coercive em-
ployer statements on employee voting,46 Gould believes that em-
ployees are capable of recognizing electioneering for what it is. 
Because I agree with the Supreme Court's admonition that "any 
balancing of [employer and employee] rights must take into ac-
count the economic dependence of the employees on their employ-
ers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that 
relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that 
might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear,"47 I 
have argued in favor of greater Labor Board regulation of this 
area.48 If truly free elections are to occur, neither party should be 
permitted to mislead intentionally or to threaten implicitly prospec-
tive voters in a manner that would be likely to affect their vote. 
Gould notes that nonemployee union organizer access to em-
ployer premises is severely limited (pp. 157-58). Such organizers 
are not permitted to distribute union literature even on retail store 
parking lots that are open to prospective customers.49 Employees 
may proselytize in favor of collectivization only during nonwork-
time, even though employer agents may disseminate their anti-
union message during worktime.50 Employers can inundate work-
ers with anti-union propaganda through captive audience speeches, 
supervisory discussions, bulletin board notices, and personal memo-
randa or letters. Business firms thus enjoy an enormous advantage 
during organizing campaigns. Gould would alleviate this substan-
tial imbalance through rules providing union organizers with access 
to company property open to the public and access to other appro-
priate areas after representation petitions have been filed (p. 158). 
This change in existing NLRA law would greatly enhance the op-
portunity of union organizers to communicate with targeted 
employees. 
Gould acknowledges that extended representation proceedings 
tend to provide employers with the extra time they need to defeat 
union organizing drives. He notes that some Canadian provinces 
45. See Juuus G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELEcnONS: LAW AND 
REALITY (1976). 
46. See, e.g., William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification 
Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 560, 567-75 (1983). 
47. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). 
48. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve 
Industrial Democracy, 34 Aruz. L. REv. 397, 411, 419 (1992). 
49. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); see also NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (banning union organizers from distributing literature on 
company-owned parking lots). 
50. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
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conduct elections within five days after union petitions have been 
filed, and he proposes similarly expedited procedures for NLRA 
elections (p. 158). The author also documents the two- or three-
year delay between the unlawful termination of union supporters 
and their judicially enforced reinstatement orders (pp. 158-59). He 
suggests that the Labor Board make greater use of Section 10G)s1 
temporary restraining orders that would allow the immediate rein-
statement of union sympathizers illegally discharged during or-
ganizing campaigns (pp. 160-61 ). This procedure would greatly 
diminish the chilling effect of discriminatory terminations during 
union organizing drives. 
Gould indicates that prolonged delays could be avoided if Con-
gress amended the NLRA to authorize Labor Board certifications 
based upon authorization card demonstrations of adequate support 
(pp. 162-63). Several Canadian provinces allow card-based certifi-
cation when unions establish fifty-five or sixty percent support, and 
this approach would greatly enhance union organizing. Gould ap-
propriately recognizes that peer pressure may induce some workers 
to sign authorization cards they might not have otherwise signed, 
and therefore he proposes that card-based certification require a 
supermajority of fifty-five or sixty percent (p. 163). Such a require-
ment would not affect most labor organizations, because few peti-
tion for Labor Board elections until they have obtained cards 
signed by sixty or seventy percent of the employees in proposed 
units. 
B. Obligation To Bargain and Scope of Bargaining Reforms 
Even when unions obtain Labor Board certification, their strug-
gle for representation rights is not over. Employers frequently de-
cline to recognize newly certified organizations, forcing them to 
prosecute refusal-to-bargain charges. It may take a year or more 
for the Labor Board to issue remedial bargaining orders in these 
cases, and losing employers can avoid bargaining for an additional 
year while the Labor Board petitions for court of appeals enforce-
ment orders. To curtail these delays, Gould proposes that Labor 
Board certifications include bargaining directives that may be di-
rectly appealed to courts of appeal without the need for unfair la-
bor practice proceedings before administrative law judges (p. 164). 
This practice would greatly diminish the delay between certifica-
tions and court-enforced bargaining orders. In cases in which em-
ployer objections to union certification are clearly without merit, 
the Labor Board should be required to seek temporary bargaining 
orders under Section lO(j) to allow prevailing unions to demand 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) {1988) authorizes district courts to grant temporary injunctive relief 
while unfair labor practice cases are being litigated. 
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bargaining while certification cases are being appealed to appellate 
courts. 
In almost forty percent of cases in which unions obtain certifica-
tion, they are unable to negotiate initial bargaining agreements.s2 
Many of these negotiation failures are due to employer recalci-
trance, as employers are disappointed with their election loss and 
hope to defeat the prevailing unions at the bargaining table through 
disingenuous bargaining. Gould supports the laws of certain Cana-
dian provinces53 that require parties that are unable to achieve first 
contracts to resolve their disputes through binding interest arbitra-
tion (pp. 168-70). Because I believe that the Labor Board should 
be given the authority to provide make-whole relief to workers vic-
timized by manifestly unjustified employer refusals-to-bargain 
through compensation awards approximating what the employees 
would presumably have obtained had the firms negotiated in good 
faith,54 I would have no difficulty accepting the concept of first con-
tract interest arbitration. 
The negotiating parties would initially attempt to achieve a vol-. 
untary resolution of their competing differences. If that objective 
could not be attained because of uncompromising employer behav-
ior, arbitral determination would resolve the conflict. Arbitrators 
should be required to follow legislatively prescribed standards, and 
they must decide which party made the more reasonable final offer 
on an issue-by-issue or total-package basis. These constraints 
would prevent unprincipled arbitral awards. The availability of 
final-offer arbitration would also encourage parties to resolve their 
initial differences through the bargaining process, in recognition of 
the fact that negotiation impasses would no longer lead to the pre-
mature emasculation of newly certified labor organizations. 
Finally, Gould decries the limited scope of bargaining currently 
available to representative labor organizations (pp. 170-73). In 
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,55 the Supreme Court 
completely ignored the proper function of unions as it severely re-
stricted the scope of bargaining required over management deci-
sions affecting employee job security: 
Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining pro-
cess to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. It 
also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may 
proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling 
S2. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON Eouc. & 
LABOR, 98TH CoNo., 2o SESS., THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW- A BE1RAYAL OF AMERICAN 
WORKERS, 10 (Comm. Print 1984), excerpted in LEROY s. MERRIFIELD ET AL, LABOR RELA· 
TIONS LAW S9, 62 (9th ed. 1994). 
S3. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 249-Sl. 
54. See Craver, supra note 48, at 433-34. 
SS. 4S2 U.S. 666 (1981). 
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its conduct an unfair labor practice .... [I)n view of an employer's 
need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over manage-
ment decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availa-
bility of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective-bargaining process, out-
weighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.56 
The First National Maintenance majority was unduly concerned 
about labor interference with managerial freedom. It failed to ac-
knowledge that when Congress enacted the NLRA, it made the leg-
islative determination that worker "interference" with managerial 
discretion was an appropriate consequence of an industrial relations 
system that provides employees with meaningful input regarding 
their basic employment conditions. Despite the curtailment of 
managerial freedom involved, I agree with Gould's proposal to ex-
pand the scope of bargaining to include most issues of real concern 
to employees (pp. 170-73). I also concur in his proposal to require 
business firms to provide representative unions with greater corpo-
rate information to enable them to perform their representational 
function more effectively (p. 175). 
Although I support the NLRA proposals that Gould makes and 
believe that they would be of limited benefit to organizing unions 
and represented employees, I also think that these modifications 
would be analogous to the rearranging of deck chairs on the 
Titanic. The American labor movement is in dire trouble, and mi-
nor NLRA changes will not make a significant difference. If the 
vast majority of U.S. workers who are unlikely to select union rep-
resentation is to receive meaningful employment rights, legislatures 
must enact laws similar to those proposed earlier with respect to the 
creation of works councils and the election of employee representa-
tives on corporate boards.57 Only these legislative programs could 
provide workers with the scope of industrial democracy that one 
should expect in a truly free society. 
V. THE ENHANCEMENT OF WORKER ECONOMIC POWER 
Gould acknowledges that industrial and economic develop-
ments have significantly diminished the efficacy of the traditional 
strike weapon (pp. 181-83). Increasingly diverse and technologi-
cally advanced business enterprises are finding it easier to with-
stand the impact of work stoppages. Managerial personnel can 
often maintain production by keeping automated equipment func-
56. 452 U.S. at 678-79. 
57. Regarding the need for more expansive and more innovative labor law reform, see 
Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.-
KE.NT L. RE.v. 3, 20-46 (1993). 
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tioning. Lost production may be transferred to facilities in other 
states or other countries. 
Another important factor contributing to the decline of the 
work stoppage concerns the lack of legal protection given to strik-
ing personnel. As early as 1938, the Supreme Court held that em-
ployers could hire permanent replacements for striking employees, 
despite the negative impact of the replacement option on the exer-
cise of the statutorily protected right to strike.58 The Court appar-
ently believed employers' need to continue operations during a 
strike outweighed employees' right to engage in work stoppages. 
Nonetheless, for over four decades, few American firms exercised 
their "right" to hire permanent replacements during work stop-
pages. Employers have used the Mackay Radio doctrine more fre-
quently in recent years, however, following President Reagan's 
1981 decision to terminate 11,000 unlawfully striking air traffic con-
trollers. A recent AFL-CIO study found that employers perma-
nently replaced eleven percent of the 243,300 individuals who 
participated in major work stoppages during 1990.59 It is doubtful 
that the thousands of displaced strikers received solace from the 
fact they had been "permanently replaced" due to employer desires 
to continue operations rather than "discharged" because of anti-
strike motivations. Most were forced to seek other gainful employ-
ment, and their representative labor organizations probably ceased 
to function as viable bargaining agents for the new workers. 
The year before Mackay Radio, when the Supreme Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of the NLRA, it eloquently acknowl-
edged that individuals lacked the capacity to counterbalance the 
economic power possessed by their corporate employers: 
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that 
they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a sin-
gle employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was 
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself 
and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he 
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and re-
sist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give 
laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.60 
If meaningful collective bargaining is to exist without the need for 
excessive government intervention, the strike weapon must be pre-
served and even strengthened. 
Gould recommends a statutory modification of the Mackay Ra-
dio rule that would prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements 
58. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1938). 
59. AFL-CIO Study Indicates Increase in Permanent Replacement of Strikers, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-3 (June 13, 1991). 
60. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). 
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until a work stoppage has continued for at least six months (pp. 
201-02). I previously suggested a balancing approach that would 
allow struck employers to continue operations initially through the 
retention of temporary replacements.61 They could only hire per-
manent replacements if they could demonstrate - after a one-, 
two-, or three-month period - that local labor market conditions 
precluded the employment of qualified temporary personnel. 
Congress enacted the original NLRA to provide individual 
workers with collective empowerment. Pursuant to that statute, 
employees involved in a labor dispute could exert direct pressure 
against the target firm, and they could enlist the support of secon-
dary parties. By inducing the employees of secondary companies to 
cease handling products going to or coming from the struck busi-
ness, the primary workers were able to increase their bargaining 
leverage. In 1947, business leaders induced Congress to proscribe 
many forms of secondary behavior, and in 1959, the legislature pro-
hibited most of the remaining forms of secondary action. 
If Congress wants to maintain a laissez faire posture, it should 
amend the NLRA to permit some forms of secondary activity.62 
When a work stoppage is effective, it shuts down the operations of 
the target firm. As a result, that firm suspends its purchases of raw 
materials and reduces its shipment of finished goods. When strik-
ing employees are unable to generate a complete cessation of pri-
mary firm operations, they could be allowed to expand their 
concerted appeal to employees of those secondary businesses that 
deal directly with the struck employer as suppliers or customers. 
They could induce the workers of those secondary firms to refuse to 
handle the raw materials destined for the struck plant or the fin-
ished goods coming from that establishment during the primary 
work stoppage. 
Business leaders would undoubtedly resist any efforts to reverse 
Mackay Radio or to expand the secondary appeals for support that 
could be made by striking employees. They realize that they are in 
a superior economic position, and they do not wish to let legislative 
modifications redress the substantial power imbalance that cur- · 
rently exists. Nonetheless, if Congress believes that viable labor or-
ganizations are indispensable attributes of industrial democracy, it 
must increase the economic leverage available to those entities. If 
members of Congress are concerned about the production losses 
that expanded work stoppages would generate, they could consider 
alternatives that would not cause operational disruptions. They 
could require resort to tripartite interest arbitration to resolve bar-
gaining disputes, with the arbitration panel selecting the more rea-
61. See Craver, supra note 48, at 422-23. 
62. See id. at 424-25. 
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sonable final offer made by the employer or the representative 
union - on an issue-by-issue or total-package approach. 
Alternatively, Congress could amend the NLRA to authorize 
only "statutory strikes" that would not entail actual work disrup-
tions.63 Once a bargaining impasse was reached, the employer or 
the union could declare a "strike." Production and services would 
continue as usual, but employee compensation would be reduced by 
a specified amount - for example, ten or fifteen percent - and 
firm revenues would be reduced by a similar percentage. If the par-
ties resolved their dispute expeditiously, the withheld compensation 
and revenues could be returned to the workers and the company. If 
the controversy was not settled quickly, however, the withheld 
funds could be permanently transferred to the public treasury. 
Although statutory strikes would not involve work disruptions, the 
statutorily prescribed financial incentives would encourage labor 
and management negotiators to resolve their controversies in an ex-
peditious manner. 
As Gould recognizes, meaningful collective bargaining is impos-
sible if one party to the interaction lacks real leverage. Over the 
past several decades, the bargaining power of labor has waned 
while that of employers has increased. Many unions are so weak 
that they are effectively reduced to collective begging. They are 
forced to take whatever the employers are willing to give them. 
Congress must decide whether the United States should become 
the only country in the advanced world to have no viable labor 
movement. If it does not move quickly, the issue will unfortunately 
become entirely academic. 
VI. CONTRASTING THE AMERICAN AND 
CANADIAN EXPERIENCES 
When observers attempt to understand the reasons for the sub-
stantial decline of U.S. labor organizations over the past several 
decades, they frequently make comparisons to the Canadian union 
experience. That nation's provincial labor relations statutes are 
similar to the NLRA, and many of their industries and trade unions 
have close ties to U.S. entities. In Chapter Seven, Gould explores 
the Canadian situation and attempts to explain why Canadian trade 
unions have not experienced the same membership losses as their 
U.S. counterparts. He notes that Canadians tend to be less individ-
ualistic than U.S. residents and that Canadians exhibit greater so-
cial and class cohesiveness.64 
63. See generally George W. Goble, The Non-Stoppage Strike, 2 LAB. L.J. 105 (1951); 
David B. McCalmont, The Semi-Strike, 15 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 191 (1962). 
64. P. 208; see Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 
B.Y.U. L REv. 727. 
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In addition, most Canadian employers respect the right of their 
employees to organize and do not resort to the overtly coercive tac-
tics used by many U.S. firms to defeat organizing campaigns. Sev-
eral of the Canadian labor statutes facilitate union organizing by 
permitting authorization-card based certification when unions ob-
tain fifty-five or sixty percent support (p. 215). Even when elec-
tions are required, they are conducted in an expedited manner -
often within five days after representation petitions are filed (pp. 
215-16). These two practices preclude unnecessary delays and limit 
the opportunity for resort to the anti-union conduct so prevalent 
during drawn-out organizing campaigns in the United States. 
U.S. employers frequently characterize proposals to allow card-
based certification under the NLRA as "radical." They overlook 
the fact that the original Wagner Act authorized card-based certifi-
cation as it provided that the Labor Board "may take a secret ballot 
of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascert[a]in 
such representatives."65 In a perfect world, I would prefer secret 
ballot elections to card checks because of the possibility that em-
ployees may have signed authorization cards due to social pressure, 
misunderstanding, or outright coercion. Congress must acknowl-
edge, however, that neutral elections do not usually occur. Em-
ployers frequently imply that pro-union votes will result in lost 
employment, and a number of firms graphically demonstrate this 
possibility through the unlawful termination of key union support-
ers during the organizing campaigns. 
If we could guarantee elections within five or ten days after the 
filing of representation petitions - and if coercive campaign tech-
niques could be effectively proscribed - resort to secret ballot 
elections would be the preferable option. If the Labor Board could 
not conduct elections on an expedited basis, then I would fav.or 
card-based certification in limited circumstances. I would prefer to 
have Congress amend the NLRA to mandate elections within five 
or ten days after petitions are filed, except when extraordinary cir-
cumstances would preclude an expedited election. 
Gould recognizes that only about two-thirds of the unions that 
receive Labor Board certification ever obtain first contracts (p. 
222). This figure is substantially below the eighty-four percent suc-
cess rate experienced by certified labor organizations in Ontario (p. 
223, tbl. 7-3). 1\vo factors account for this difference: (i) U.S. em-
ployers know that if they can avoid the execution of bargaining 
agreements during the certification year, they can often defeat the 
newly certified unions;66 and (ii) the Ontario labor relations statute 
65. Wagner Act, ch. 372, sec. 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935), set forth in N.LR.B., LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TiiE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 3274 (1959). 
66. See LEVIIT & CoNRow, supra note 24, at 201-25. 
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mandates first-contract interest arbitration when the negotiating 
parties are unable to achieve their own agreements due to employer 
recalcitrance (pp. 222-27). 
VII. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
William Gould has written a thoughtful and provocative book 
that is especially timely due to the election of President Clinton, the 
creation of the Dunlop Commission to study the need for labor law 
reform, and the appointment of Gould himself as Chair of the 
NLRB. Americans must decide whether we believe that independ-
ent labor organizations are an important aspect of a democratic so-
ciety. If we do not act quickly to reverse the long-standing union 
decline, labor entities may become irrelevant by the end of this dec-
ade. The NLRA changes that Gould proposes would certainly 
help. Election campaigns would become less coercive, and the cer-
tification process would be greatly expedited. Employee free 
choice would be more effectively protected, and unions would 
probably obtain more certifications than they do under existing 
NLRA doctrines. 
Gould implicitly acknowledges, however, that a labor move-
ment revival would not likely extend collective protection to a ma-
jority of U.S. employees. Many would be hesitant to organize for 
fear of being considered unprofessional or even lower class. Never-
theless, innovative new entities may be created that would be more 
analogous to the American Bar Association or the American Medi-
cal Association than to present AFL-CIO affiliates, and such orga-
nizations would have a greater appeal to white-collar and 
professional personnel. It is important to remember that the Amer-
ican Nurses Association, the National Education Association, the 
American Association of University Professors, and similar entities 
were, not so long ago, wholly professional groups with no labor 
agendas. The British Medical Association, by contrast, has been a 
registered trade union for several decades. 
Despite the image of U.S. residents as rugged individualists, 
most Americans are group-oriented when they endeavor to ad-
vance their economic interests. Business firms are associated with 
various groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, and specific industry organizations. 
Attorneys have the American Bar Association, physicians the 
American Medical Association, older people the American Associ-
ation of Retired Persons, women the National Organization for 
Women, and African-Americans the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. Each distinct profession has at 
least one professional group to advance member interests. It is in-
deed ironic that although collective power is appropriate for profes-
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sionals and independent entrepreneurs, it is considered 
inappropriate and unprofessional for rank-and-file workers. Those 
persons who most lack individual bargaining power and who most 
need a collective voice to advance their interests are expected and 
even encouraged to eschew organizational strength. Employers go 
to great lengths to prevent their employees from enjoying the same 
group benefits they derive from their own professional associations. 
Congress should finally ensure that workers have the unfettered 
right to organize that the Wagner Act originally granted to employ-
ees. The adoption of Gould's proposed NLRA amendments would 
constitute a significant improvement over the status quo. 
Labor law experts must now admit that the NLRA has become 
an antiquated and relatively meaningless statute. It no longer pro-
tects worker organizational rights, nor does it provide unionized 
employees with expansive bargaining opportunities or meaningful 
economic leverage. If the vast majority of private sector personnel 
are to enjoy employment rights beyond the minimal terms unilater-
ally offered by their employers, those privileges will have to be pro-
vided through federal legislation. 
The most effective way to grant employees meaningful influence 
over their terms of employment would be to mandate the creation 
of shop-level works councils and the election of employee repre-
sentatives to corporate boards. These worker participation pro-
grams would give individual employees the right to be consulted 
regarding contemplated firm policies that would affect their em-
ployment interests. Local works _councils could also explore ways in 
which to increase productivity and product or service quality in a 
manner that would simultaneously advance the interests of both 
workers and employers. I am disappointed that Gould does not 
support legislatively-mandated worker participation programs. 
I agree with Gould that specific statutory provisions should pro-
hibit unjust dismissals and provide administrative or arbitral proce-
dures to review challenged terminations. I also think that Congress 
should acknowledge the unconscionably low wages and minimal 
fringe benefits enjoyed by millions of American workers. Elected 
representatives can no longer assume that these issues are resolved 
through private collective bargaining, because so few individuals 
have their employment terms determined through the collective 
process. The minimum wage should be increased to an appropriate 
level, with variable scales adopted to take into account the capacity 
of different industries to afford specified labor costs. 
Anyone concerned with the rights of American workers should 
read Agenda for Reform. It contains many proposals that would 
enhance the employment interests of most persons. Nonetheless, 
readers should recognize that Gould's suggestions provide only a 
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modest beginning. If U.S. personnel are to enjoy the fundamental 
rights already available to workers in most other advanced nations, 
far more legislative protections are necessary. These changes may 
initially seem radical, but they would merely prepare the United 
States for the twenty-first century. The other industrial nations 
have already demonstrated that firms can maintain humane em-
ployment conditions and still be competitive in a global economy. 
It is time for the United States to exhibit a similar commitment to 
its most precious resource - its human capital.67 
67. See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law To Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 899 
(1993). 
